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Abstract Distortions in memory impose important bounds on rationality but
have been largely disregarded in economics. While it is possible to learn, it is
more diﬃcult, and sometimes impossible, to unlearn. This retention eﬀect
lowers individual utility directly or via reduced productivity, and adds costs
to principal-agent relationships. The engraving eﬀect states that the more
one tries to forget a piece of information the more vivid it stays in memory,
leading to a paradoxical outcome. The eﬀects are based on, and are sup-
ported by, psychological experiments, and it is shown that they are relevant
in many economic situations and beyond.
Keywords Memory Æ Bounded rationality Æ Learning Æ Retention Æ Ironic
process theory Æ Principal–agency theory
1 Asymmetric memory control
Individuals have only imperfect control over their memory. They are not
able to learn everything that they would like to know. But it is possible to
integrate new knowledge into one’s memory by applying suﬃcient eﬀort,
time and resources.
Interestingly enough, in some important circumstances, forgetting or
removing information from one’s memory, is diﬃcult to achieve and
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sometimes even impossible. While there are mental strategies helping us to
forget,1 in many cases it cannot be achieved at all. It is, for example,
impossible to forget the information that an object one has bought, believing
that it is an original work of art (say a Picasso painting), is in fact a fake. One
would be better oﬀ not knowing that it is a fake, but one cannot choose to
forget such utility reducing information. This ‘‘retention eﬀect’’ suggests that
there is a fundamental asymmetry between learning and unlearning.
Moreover, making an eﬀort to get rid of a piece of information stored in
our memory tends to have a counterproductive eﬀect: it is rendered more
vivid and therewith is stored more eﬀectively in our memory. The advice by
well–meaning friends to forget that one has acted like a fool in the past tends
to make the occurrence more, and not less, salient in our memory. This
‘‘engraving eﬀect’’ produces higher transaction costs in principal–agent
relationships. Parents who constantly advise their children not to drink
alcohol, to take drugs or to engage in sex, often make it more diﬃcult for the
children not to think of it. An important case involves judges who, following
the rule of admissible evidence, must instruct the jury to ignore particular
evidence. But such orders tend to make the evidence more, rather than less,
salient in the jury members’ memory. Once jurors know certain information,
they ﬁnd it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to refrain from giving it further
consideration. Caspar et al. (1988; see also Edwards and Bryan 1997) pre-
sented mock jurors with a case in which police oﬃcers entered a person’s ﬂat
without a warrant and injured the occupant. Some jurors were given the
information that the police found contraband in the ﬂat. Despite the fact
that the jurors were instructed that this information should not be taken into
account when deciding about the damages the occupant of the ﬂat should be
awarded by way of compensation for his injuries, the jurors awarded sig-
niﬁcantly lower settlement when the contraband was mentioned than when it
was not mentioned. Instructions to ignore the contraband proved to be
ineﬀective; the jurors were unable to forget this piece of evidence.
The restrictions on unlearning lead to an overrepresentation in memory
of undesired information. It reduces individual utility directly or indirectly
by aﬀecting behavior. It distorts resource allocation and produces economic
costs which otherwise would be absent. The diﬃculty in forgetting is also of
direct relevance in many economic activities. An example is one company
being taken over by another company. In the case of such mergers, the
employees of the company taken over tend to cling to the routines they
learned in the old company. They ﬁnd it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to forget
how things were done there. The high cost of merging the ‘‘cultures’’ of ﬁrms,
and often the failure to achieve it, is consistent with the retention eﬀect.
1 For instance, distracting oneself by going on vacation or changing one’s work place or
place of living. See more fully Golding and MacLeod (1998). For more general applications
to history and politics, see e.g., Weinreich (2000), Rothstein (2000) and Horne and Levi
(2002). Most psychological theories of memory assume that there is no real erasing of
memory. An adequate metapher is a library in which no book is lost but individuals no
longer know where it is located. If one had the correct location signature one would be able
to ﬁnd the book again. In social psychology this process is known as ‘‘cognitive access-
ability’’. See e.g., Higgins (1989).
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Non-forgetting also plays a role at the macro–economic level. Thus, for
example, in the 1930’s the German population was unable to forget the
hyperinﬂation of the 1920’s, though the economic situation changed dra-
matically and the great Depression set in. The German government then
pursued a deﬂationary policy by running a budget surplus when an expan-
sionary policy would have been more appropriate.
This paper focuses on the distortions caused by the cost of unlearning or
non-forgetting. This, of course, does not mean that learning is unimportant
or that it is always impossible to forget. Much of what we think and do is
indeed forgotten. Neither is it argued that the impossibility to forget may, in
certain situations, help people to behave rationally in the long run.2 In that
sense, the failure to forget may in some respects be evolutionarily advanta-
geous. While these aspects may be important, they are neglected here in
order to concentrate on those cases where non-forgetting is an instance of
bounded rationality.
The argument developed is based on two fundamental assumptions:
1. Some pieces of information stored in the memory are diﬃcult, and others
are even impossible, to forget;
2. Individuals have limited control over forgetting.
Consequently, the retention and the engraving eﬀects are major limita-
tions on individual human rationality important for economics and beyond.
Section 2 links these ideas to related literature in economics. Section 3 dis-
cusses the retention eﬀect, relates it to insights gained in social psychology
and demonstrates its importance for economic and social behavior. Section 4
does the same for the engraving eﬀect. The following Section 5 identiﬁes the
costs produced by the two kinds of memory distortions. Section 6 concludes.
The reader should be warned that this paper should be considered a ﬁrst,
and necessarily incomplete, attempt to analyze the economic consequences of
having incomplete control over forgetting. Wherever possible, the arguments
are bolstered by empirical evidence. But in many cases there is, to my
knowledge, no such evidence available. This paper may therefore also serve
as an incentive to provide empirical evidence preferably not only by labo-
ratory experiments but also ﬁeld data.
2 Related literature
Economists have long been aware that individuals are not fully but only
boundedly rational (Simon 1957, 1982; Selten and Tietz 1980). One can go
even further: ‘‘Individuals make systematic errors that make them worse oﬀ’’
(Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, p. 116). Distortion of judgment caused by
imperfect retrievals from memory, among others the endowment and the
sunk cost eﬀects, and in particular, the hindsight bias, have been extensively
studied in the literature on behavioral anomalies (e.g., Haskie and Dawes
2 When individuals are driven to act according to their short run, instead of their long
run, interests they may be helped by the impossibility of forgetting.
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2001, and Frey and Eichenberger 1994). That individuals make systematic
(rather than purely random) errors is inconsistent with standard neoclassical
economic theory which is based on the assumption that individuals maximize
their own utility (subject to constraints). As a consequence, revealed pref-
erence allows us to deduce the underlying preferences from observed
behavior. This relationship is no longer valid once it is acknowledged that
individuals make systematic mistakes (see, in the context of happiness
research, Frey and Stutzer 2004).
Memory distortions have been an important topic in psychology for a
long time; a recent prominent example is Kahneman (Kahneman 1999,
2000). In contrast, only a few economists have worked on this topic. A major
exception is Mullainanthan (2000; see also Dow 1991), who looks at the
eﬀects of learning on human behavior. He distinguishes between ‘‘rehearsal’’
and ‘‘associativeness’’ as determinants, and identiﬁes the conditions under
which the beliefs thus generated lead, on average, to over–reaction and
under–reactions. In an elaborate theoretical model, he is able to show that
individual consumption behavior diﬀers from the predictions made on the
basis of the standard neoclassical model. However, he provides only a few
real life applications and does not test his hypotheses empirically. His ap-
proach and my approach share the view that ‘‘memory limitations might be
an important component for realistic models attempting a uniﬁed treatment
of bounded rationality’’ (Mullainanthan 2000, p. 31).
The ‘‘curse of knowledge’’ suggests that better informed agents are
unable to ignore private information even when it is in their own interests to
do so. Thus, having more information is not always better. Camerer et al.
(1989) accordingly develop the concept of a ‘‘utility decreasing stock of
information’’, which is closely related to the memory distortion developed
here. Regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Bell 1982) also looks at a
situation where individuals suﬀer a utility loss because they compare with
what they could have gained. They would be better oﬀ not to compare the
choice they made with other alternatives. Cognitive dissonance theory (see
Festinger 1957) suggests that people are aware that they suﬀer a utility loss
when they receive particular information after having made a choice, and
therefore shield themselves from such information. Akerlof and Dickens
(1982; see also Gilad et al. 1987) show that such an eﬀort can have important
behavioral consequences.
Some economics scholars have observed that it may be counterproduc-
tive, or at least futile, to try to actively remedy an unfortunate situation.
Thus, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, p. 119) argue for the case of insuﬃcient
will–power, that ‘‘in many situations, being aware of self–control problems
can exacerbate self-control problems’’. It has also been shown that a con-
scious eﬀort to achieve happiness tends to backﬁre, as empirically shown by
Schooler et al. (2001).
The retention and engraving eﬀects are based on the observation that
individuals are only incompletely able to control the kind and extent of for-
getting. The process of unlearning is to some extent exogenous. A recent
literature in economics deals withmemory manipulation, i.e., looks at memory
as something which can be inﬂuenced. Carillo andMariotti (2000) formalize a
particular aspect of such endogenization of memory, the ex ante cost of
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memory manipulation via the choice of information structure. Pathbreaking
and most fascinating work on endogenizing memory is due to Be´nabou and
Tirole (2004), where memory manipulation tends to be ex ante costly for
individuals with low time inconsistency, but beneﬁcial for those persons with
substantial time inconsistency. Following Be´nabou and Tirole (2004), mem-
ory manipulation may lead to compulsiveness. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2004)
study the consequences of denial of death, a widespread and surprising
phenomenon in view of the fact that the only certain thing in life is eventual
death. Dessi (2003) explicitly deals with ‘‘collective memory’’, but unlike
many philosophers and sociologists does so on the basis of individual choice.
3 The retention effect
The retention eﬀect states that, under certain conditions, individuals retain
useless or damaging information in their memory. They are unable to get rid
of such information, much though they would like to. As a result, the cor-
responding (undesired) information is over-represented in the memory and
provokes systematically distorted decisions and biased behavior. The dis-
tortions manifest themselves in three ways:
1. The utility of a person subject to the retention eﬀect is directly reduced.
This is like the example already mentioned of being informed that one
does not own a real Picasso painting but a fake. The person, who bought
the painting for their own pleasure, experiences extreme disappointment
and would certainly be better oﬀ not knowing that the painting is an
imitation. But the person ﬁnds it impossible to forget the information
stored in their memory.3
2. Utility is indirectly reduced due to overrepresentation, leading to distor-
tions in behavior and resource allocation. An example is a poor person
who makes a fortune but cannot forget his miserable past, much though
he would like to. The person has not adjusted his or her ‘‘cultural capital’’
to the new position achieved. As a consequence, his consumption
behavior is that of a ‘‘nouveau riche’’, though he would love not to appear
as such.4 Another case is a principal who ﬁnds it more costly to make his
agents behave in his best interests because the agents’ memory is marred
by incompatible information. A good example is that of the employees of
a company taken over by another company, who ﬁnd it impossible to
forget the previous routines. This tends to make them unﬁt to follow the
routines appropriate in the new company. Such failure to unlearn makes a
3 The point is not that the painting has a reduced monetary value and can only be sold at
a lower price. The monetary loss is obvious and does not constitute any anomaly. The
example refers to the direct utility loss due to knowing that the painting is a fake. That such
a utility loss occurs is one of the ‘‘classical’’ paradoxes in the economics of art (see e.g.,
Throsby 2001; Towse 1997; Blaug 2001; Frey and Pommerehne 1989; Frey 2000).
4 The general phenomenon of ‘‘underconsumption’’ and ‘‘overconsumption’’ has been
analyzed by Ameriks et al. (2003), and also by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004).
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merger more costly than it would otherwise be. It may even lead to total
failure, with large economic costs.
3. The retention eﬀect has been studied in psychology in the general context
of ‘‘thought suppression’’ (Wegner 1998, and Wenzlaﬀ and Wegner 2000,
provide an extensive survey, including much experimental evidence; see
also Beevers et al. 1999) and, somewhat more speciﬁcally, of ‘‘intentional
forgetting’’ (see for instance Golding and MacLoed 1998).5 This paper
intends to study the importance of the retention eﬀect for the economy
and society, by discussing speciﬁc real life observations consistent with it.
Most of these applications are obvious so that they only need to be
mentioned brieﬂy.
Not being able to forget an event directly reducing utility is a common
phenomenon, which probably most readers have experienced for themselves.
A typical situation is when one has unwillingly violated social customs and
norms and has embarrassed oneself. An example would be to put in an
appearance at a small dinner party because one thinks one has been invited,
but in actual fact was not. Another example would be telling the same story
more than once to the same person. Most, but not all, people feel extremely
embarrassed by such events and would be happy to forget their unfortunate
behavior, but (at least for some time) retain it in their memory.
Another typical situation has to do with traumatic experiences occurring
in one’s past. In the economic sphere, examples are poverty or wealth in one’s
youth aﬀecting present consumption behavior in the sense of overspending,
like with the ‘‘nouveau riche’’. Other people may respond in the opposite way,
namely by acting like misers. But both reactions are undesired by the people
in question; they would prefer to be able to shed their childhood experiences
and consume in a way appropriate to the new status. Another instance is that
of parents who have an alcohol problem. This may induce their children to
abstain completely, even though they might like to enjoy a good glass of wine.
The eﬀect of physical violence or feeling a failure at school may inﬂuence
behavior as a grown–up against one’s will. Some children who have attended
a strict religious school cannot get rid of this memory and later violently rebel
against the respective church, though they are well aware that it is against
their own interests. The same holds for sexual violations (see the evidence in
Kuyken and Brewin 1995, and, in a somewhat diﬀerent context, in Johnston
et al. 1997). As has already been mentioned, experiencing Hyperinﬂation and
Depression often aﬀect people’s consumption and work behavior for a long
time, though they would be better oﬀ without that memory. It has been
empirically shown that spells of unemployment ‘‘scar’’ people for an extended
period of time afterwards and make it more diﬃcult for them to ﬁnd a new job
(see Clark et al. 2001). Other traumatic experiences from the past which may
strongly inﬂuence present consumption and work behavior in an undesirable
5 The state of psychological research on memory is presented by, for example, Spear and
Riccio (1994), Schacter (1996, 2001) and Schacter and Scarry (2000). This paper uses the
concept of memory in a broad way. Future work on the economic consequences of the
limited control of unlearning may ﬁnd it useful to distinguish between memory and con-
scious awareness (see, more fully, Wegner 1998).
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way by the persons concerned are experiencing wars or captivity. Some
persons, for instance, who were detained in a German concentration camp,
simply cannot bring themselves to buy a German car, even if they would like
to.
Yet another set of instances of direct utility decreasing retention is getting
the information that you have just missed an opportunity. Persons who
narrowly missed catching a train or plane, or winning the jackpot in a lot-
tery, would be better oﬀ to be able to forget such information, but in many
cases cannot.
A ﬁnal set of cases in which the retention eﬀect directly aﬀects utility
occurs when information decreases the intrinsic value of a person or an
object. Many husbands would prefer not to know that the child they rear
with their wife has been fathered by another man. But once they know, they
cannot forget and often become unhappy, which sometimes results in the
breakdown of the marriage. Similarly, many if not most people would prefer
not to learn that they have contracted an illness for which there is no cure.
Many people would feel better oﬀ not having this information but, once they
know, they are totally unable to forget.
Other retention eﬀects impair a person’s productivity and therefore indi-
rectly lower a person’s utility.6
One example is having misleading or wrong information stored in one’s
memory, without which one would be able to act in a more productive way.
Capital markets provide an illustration: in order to invest successfully,
information relating to the past is best forgotten – at least if one accepts that
these markets are dominated by random walks. But most persons ﬁnd it
impossible to disregard past experiences when they make investment deci-
sions. For instance, they believe that if the price of a stock has fallen by a
certain percentage compared to the past, its value must rise again.
A second example in which the retention eﬀect lowers individual pro-
ductivity occurs when people stick to ideas or rules which have outlived their
usefulness.7 Take the case of scholars committed to old theories, when there
are superior new ones. It has sometimes even been argued that new theories
can only be introduced by new generations of scholars. Some economists
would consider the introduction of Keynesianism after the War, and later
New Classical Macroeconomics, to be cases in point (but that is contro-
versial). The argument is that scholars would like to get rid of old ideas but
are unable to do so.8 Similarly, the suppression of stereotypes is diﬃcult to
achieve, as has been experimentally shown by Monteith et al. (1998) and
Monteith et al. (1998).
6 The importance of learning and forgetting for productivity is discussed for example for
aircraft production by Benkard (2000), for ship production by Argote et al. (1990), and for
services by Darr et al. (1995).
7 This is similar to Mullainanthan’s (2000) rehearsal eﬀect.
8 There is an alternative explanation of the resistance of older scholars to adopt new
theories: they have accumulated intellectual capital in the old ideas and are therefore rel-
atively more competitive in using and amending them than are younger scholars. They do
not have this comparative advantage with new theories and are therefore reluctant to take
them up, and sometimes ﬁght them.
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Another example of productivity decreasing retention refers to discrimi-
nation. People often judge minorities by resorting to ‘‘statistical discrimi-
nation’’, whereby its individual members are evaluated according to the
average performance of the minority instead of according to the particular
person’s productivity. Thus, for example, female researchers get fewer and
smaller grants, even when they have more and better publications than male
researchers.9 Another example is that (both male and female) airplane pas-
sengers used to prefer male pilots. Such discrimination is consistent with the
retention eﬀect. People are unable to get rid of the average information
concerning particular minorities stored in their memory and are therefore
incapable of judging a particular person according to his or her individual
merits. Such statistical discrimination is of considerable importance, espe-
cially on the labor market.
There are also many instances where the retention eﬀect adds to the cost
of principal–agent relationships.
Older employees often ﬁnd it diﬃcult, or even impossible, to adopt new
rules, routines and techniques, because they are unable to eliminate the old
ones from their memory, even if they are more than willing to do so. One of
the consequences is that they are forced to retire earlier than they wish,
though their physical productivity is as high as ever. The high cost of mergers
may also be attributed to a similar retention eﬀect.
4 The engraving effect
The engraving eﬀect states that a person’s attempt to dispose of information
in their memory makes such information more vivid and therefore accen-
tuates the retention eﬀect. The eﬀort to forget is counterproductive as it leads
to the opposite of what one is trying to achieve. The engraving eﬀect involves
two types of cost: the counterproductive eﬀect itself, which strengthens the
retention eﬀect, and the resources in terms of time, eﬀort and involvement of
other persons used in the attempt to forget.
This paradoxical eﬀect has been analyzed in psychology as ‘‘ironic pro-
cess theory’’ (Wegner 1989, 1994, 1997, 1998; Wegner and Wenzlaﬀ 1996).
The so-called ‘‘white bear’’ experiment10 (Wegner et al. 1987) shows that
suppressed thoughts may occupy a more important place than before any
attempt was made at suppression. As ironic process theory is part of the
experimental psychology of memory and thinking, the consequences on
behavior in actual life situations have received small thrift.
9 I owe this example to Margit Osterloh.
10 If thought suppression worked perfectly, no unwanted thoughts would remain in the
memory at all. The experiment assumes that college students in Texas would almost never
think of a white bear spontaneously. The evidence shows, however, that such a thought
regularly rebounded during or after suppression. This is an indication that suppression was
not successful. Further experiments are summarized by Wenzlaﬀ and Wegner (2000, pp. 61–
64, 67–68). The post–suppression rebound eﬀect has been replicated many times – recently,
for instance, by Kelly and Kahn (1994), Lavy and van den Hout (1994), McNally and
Ricciardi (1996), and Harvey and Briant (1998).
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The engraving eﬀect is more general than the retention eﬀect because the
latter refers to particular events which individuals ﬁnd diﬃcult or impossible
to forget. The engraving eﬀect, in contrast, is produced by the eﬀort to forget
which may be the case for all possible events. The engraving eﬀect can
moreover be considered a speciﬁc instance of a broader phenomenon,
namely the aﬀermative consequences of negation. Dealing with the informa-
tion that something is not the case generates cognitive structures favoring
aﬃrmation and, under particular conditions, leads to corresponding evalu-
ations. In the case of the engraving eﬀect, the speciﬁcation of the intention to
forget activates those issues which one tries to de-activate.11
There are many relevant real life instances reﬂecting the eﬀect of
engraving.
Utility is directly reduced when persons resort to ‘‘ruminations’’ about
earlier decisions. Such activity strengthens retention and reduces welfare, but
the persons concerned are unable to stop thinking back. Much experimental
evidence also suggests that persons with eating disorders, who try to suppress
these cravings, end up thinking even more about them. As a consequence,
they are less able to solve their eating problems, making them increasingly
miserable (see Herman and Polivy 1993). Similar counterproductive eﬀects
may occur with persons subject to deviant sexual thoughts, for instance child
molesters (Johnston et al. 1997; Johnston et al. 1997).
More generally, research on happiness (see Frey and Stutzer 2002, 2003)
suggests that persons aspiring to raise their happiness are less able to do so
than are persons who do not think about it, but just get on with their lives
(the empirical evidence is provided by Schooler et al. 2001). Individuals
focusing on how they could make themselves happier store the existing gap
vividly in their memory, which is consistent with the engraving eﬀect.
Engraving in one’s memory is particularly strong when it is induced from
outside, i.e., in a principal-agent setting . An important case has been men-
tioned in the introduction, namely judges instructing jurors to disregard
particular evidence. But getting such an instruction in actual fact served to
reinforce such evidence in jurors’ memories. Another case occurs when
teachers warn their pupils not to cheat in exams. These admonitions make
cheating more salient in pupils’ memory, possibly leading to a counterpro-
ductive result. More important for economics are warnings provided by tax
authorities not to cheat. Such statements suggest to taxpayers that cheating
is a real possibility. Another interpretation is also possible. The admonitions
may signal to the addressees that cheating is widely practiced. Cheating
becomes considered a less serious violation of norms ‘‘because everybody
does it’’, and the perceived probability of being detected falls. As a result,
cheating tends to increase. Preliminary evidence for taxpaying in Switzerland
is consistent with a counterproductive eﬀect due to engraving (see Feld and
Frey 2002 et al. 2002).
11 I owe this generalization to Fritz Strack (personal communication). See Strack and
Deutsch (2004), and Mussweiler and Strack (2001).
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The discussion and the empirical evidence cited suggest that the retention
and the engraving eﬀects occur in many parts of the economy and beyond.
Such distortions of memory should not be neglected by economic theory.
The next section analyzes the determinants of the size of the cost induced by
the two eﬀects.
5 The costs of memory distortion
There are four major variables determining the cost of not forgetting. The
retention and the engraving eﬀects may be hypothesized to have more
inﬂuence on individual behavior, and more inﬂuence on raising the costs:
1. The more vividly the information is stored in memory. Psychological re-
search suggests that emotional information is more diﬃcult to suppress
than neutral information (see, e.g., Davies and Clark 1998) and when it is
presented in a graphic and upsetting setting rather than in a sterile setting
(see Edwards and Bryan 1997). In the context of research on happiness, it
has been found that the highest intensity of a (negative) experience is
remembered but not lower doses (see Kahneman 1999, 2000);
2. the less time has elapsed since a piece of information entered the memory.
Forgetting takes a hyperbolic form. Recently assimilated information is
more likely to be forgotten than information acquired in the past; this is
known as Jost’s Law (Loewenstein and Elster 1992; Rachlin and Raineri
1992). It has also been empirically established that the end point of a
(negative) experience matters while the actual duration is neglected (see
Kahneman 1999, 2000);
3. the more dynamic the environment is. Not being able to forget produces
higher costs for individuals who live in societies or have occupations
subject to rapid change rather than those living in more stable environ-
ments. Spatially and socially mobile persons also suﬀer higher costs from
not being able to forget;
4. the more important the piece of information is. The retention and
engraving eﬀects produce substantial costs when the information con-
cerned is crucial for one’s life, job, investment or consumption. In con-
trast, it matters little if an individual conserves unimportant or totally
irrelevant information in his or her memory.12 This view is somewhat
counterintuitive as it is often said that one should forget unimportant,
and remember important, information. This is true only if the important
information is at the same time useful information. Individuals beneﬁt if
they can shed information which was important in the past but which has
outlived its usefulness.
12 Except perhaps if the memory is ‘‘overloaded’’, but this does not seem to be a serious
restriction.
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6 Conclusions
Distortions of memory due to the problem of unlearning useless information
are of considerable importance in many economic and social situations. Some
information is virtually impossible, while other information is diﬃcult, to
forget. This retention eﬀect imposes costs on individuals by reducing their
utility and productivity, andmakes principal–agent relationships less eﬀective.
The engraving eﬀect designates an even more powerful distortion of
memory and leads to counterproductive outcomes. The eﬀort to dispose of
pieces of useless information stored in memory makes it even harder to
unlearn it and consumes resources.
This paper seeks to outline the importance of limited control over
unlearning for economics. Much further theoretical and empirical work is
needed to analyze more precisely under what conditions, and to what extent,
the retention and engraving eﬀects apply. Future research may also endeavor
to isolate self-binding rules helping people to avoid the errors due to the
insuﬃcient control over unlearning. An example are couples who agree not
to inform each other about occasional inﬁdelities knowing that they would
overreact to such information and would destroy an otherwise well–func-
tioning and highly valued relationship. Similar self–binding rules may pos-
sibly be found with actors on ﬁnancial markets. Reactions and
countermeasures to the retention and engraving eﬀects may also be found at
the societal level in the form of collective institutions (such as analyzed in
Frey and Eichenberger 1994 for the case of behavioral anomalies).
This paper has achieved its goal if the attention of scholars has been
drawn to how important the systematically limited control over forgetting is
for the economy and society.
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